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FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP: HOW THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SHOULD BETTER SUPPORT ITS STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OFFICES IN TIMES OF CRISIS
Maddie McFee*

ABSTRACT
In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused millions of people to lose their jobs
and become dependent on unemployment benefits. State unemployment offices were
not prepared for this sudden onslaught of claims. Offices could not increase staffing
levels because they were not given money by the federal government to do so. As offices
were overwhelmed, a scammer group named Scattered Canary took this opportunity to
fraudulently claim millions of dollars from several states. Because the federal
government supplies administrative funds to states based on average previous need, the
system is not designed to support states’ increased needs during sudden economic
downturns. This Note argues that the federal government should allot a portion of
money within the currently existing Federal Unemployment Fund to create a source of
emergency money for states during emergencies. These funds would provide asrequested grants to states to increase staffing more quickly than would otherwise be
possible through existing emergency routes. Through the creation of this fund, the
federal government would fulfill its part of the federal-state partnership and prevent
widespread harm to states during economic crises.
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INTRODUCTION
Millions of people in the United States rely on unemployment
benefits to help them survive when they lose their jobs. When these
benefits are delayed or put on hold, people are unable to pay their bills,
which leads to debt, loss of services such as utilities, and, in some cases,
eviction. There is little recourse for those affected by delayed benefits
other than to simply wait.
Unemployment claims spiked in the spring of 2020, as more and
more people were laid off due to shutdowns caused by the COVID-19
pandemic. 1 As claims increased, a scammer group called Scattered
Canary took the opportunity to submit thousands of fraudulent
unemployment claims in a handful of states, including Washington. 2
Washington’s Employment Security Department said the group had
already stolen “hundreds of millions of dollars” by the time the fraud
was discovered. 3 The state paused its benefits distribution to sort
through its fraudulent claims, 4 leaving thousands of Washington
residents who were seeking benefits without this income. 5 Scattered
Canary and other fraudulent claimants also targeted most other states.6
1. See Jim Brunner, Paul Roberts & Patrick Malone, How Missed “Red Flags” Helped Nigerian
Fraud Ring “Scattered Canary” Bilk Washington’s Unemployment System Among Coronavirus Chaos,
SEATTLE TIMES (June 4, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/timeswatchdog/how-missed-red-flags-helped-nigerian-fraud-ring-scattered-canary-bilk-washingtonsunemployment-system-amid-coronavirus-chaos/ [https://perma.cc/S3C8-GT8Z].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See Massive Fraud Against State Unemployment Insurance Programs, U.S. SECRET SERV.
(May 14, 2020), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6891584-GIOC-Alert-20-027-I-StateUnemployment-Fraud-002.html [https://perma.cc/933Q-ZQMN]; see also Lily Hay Newman, The
Nigerian Fraudsters Ripping off the Unemployment System, WIRED (May 19, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://
www.wired.com/story/nigerian-scammers-unemployment-system-scattered-canary/
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The Social Security Act of 1935 (“SSA”) created an unemployment
insurance program run by individual states with federal oversight and
subsidy. 7 The Act also created a federal fund within the U.S. Treasury
that pays the states to administer their unemployment offices. 8 The
administrative funds that states receive are then used to pay employees
at unemployment benefit offices. 9 Because the base amount paid to
each state is determined through an analysis of the previous year’s costs
and unemployment demands, 10 the system is poorly set up to handle
unforeseeable crises. During sudden unemployment spikes, like the
one caused by the COVID-19 economic crisis, unemployment offices
throughout the country do not have sufficient staff to handle the surge
in benefits requests.
States have few options when they need extra money for
administrative costs. They can request more money from the federal
government, but this can only be done quarterly, and full payment is
not guaranteed. 11 States may also receive money through other trusts
within the Federal Reserve, but these funds depend on congressional
action. 12 In the face of an immediate crisis, a state’s only option is
simply to make do with the administrative money currently on hand.
The Federal Unemployment Account (FUA) gives loans to states for
the payment of unemployment benefits when states’ accounts are
overdrawn.13 In this Note, I propose that FUA allocate a portion of its
funding to a second emergency fund, created specifically to help states
pay higher administrative costs in the face of a sudden economic crisis.
In contrast to how FUA currently distributes emergency funds, this pot
of money would be given to the states as grants, not loans (after all,
administrative costs are the responsibility of the federal government).14
These funds would be administered immediately after states request
them, upon states meeting certain criteria, and would not depend on
congressional action. With this program in place, states would be able

[https://perma.cc/RRJ9-R34A]; Joe Henke, State Says Fraud Investigations Slowing Unemployment
Benefit Investigations, 11 ALIVE (July 24, 2020, 7:09 PM), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/health
/coronavirus/georgia-unemployment-benefits-delayed-by-fraud-investigations/85-ac844f39-8bd84714-b756-9c748bb36b01 [https://perma.cc/HG6T-T3Z6].
7. Social Security Programs in the United States – Unemployment Insurance, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/sspus/unemploy.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZM4-5FL3].
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1101.
9. 2 U.S.C. § 1101(c).
10. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DIRECTORS’ GUIDE 13 (2015), https://
oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/ui_directors_Sep2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TLU-S7NX]
[hereinafter DIRECTORS’ GUIDE].
11. Id. at 14.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1105.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1104(g).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1101.
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to quickly acquire staff during an economic crisis and more efficiently
prevent unemployment benefit fraud and slowdowns.
Part I examines the current federal unemployment insurance
statute and the Scattered Canary scam. Part II considers how current
law underfunds state offices when crises occur and explain why this is a
problem. Part II also details and rejects alternative hypotheses for
reform. Finally, Part III explains the reforms that the federal
government must implement to prevent unemployment insurance
fraud and reduce delays in disbursing unemployment benefits.
I. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAW AND SCATTERED CANARY
A. Understaffing Due to Underfunding
Unemployment benefits in the United States are part of a federal
program executed by the individual states. In general, each state must
generate the funds necessary to pay unemployment benefits through
state unemployment taxes imposed on employers. 15 The federal
government supplies funds for administrative costs, such as paying
office employees, to states with federally approved unemployment
benefits programs. 16 These funds are allocated on a yearly basis, and
states are not guaranteed extra funds when they need them. 17
Section 904 of the SSA authorizes a portion of the Federal Treasury
to be allocated to the Unemployment Trust Fund to cover costs apart
from direct unemployment benefits payments. 18 Within the
Unemployment Trust Fund are many smaller funds. These include the
Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA), which funds
state administrative costs; 19 the Extended Unemployment
Compensation Account (EUCA), which pays benefits to claimants who
qualify for extended compensation after their normal state-allocated
benefits run out; 20 and the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA),
which houses emergency funds that states can borrow when their own
funds run out during economic downturns. 21 Each state’s individual

15. See Federal Unemployment Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.irs.gov
/individuals/international-taxpayers/federal-unemployment-tax [https://perma.cc/63LY-NG3M].
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1101.
17. DIRECTORS’ GUIDE, supra note 10, at 13.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1104(a), (g).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1101(a).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1104(g).
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unemployment fund is also housed within the Unemployment Trust
Fund. 22
Under the SSA, ESAA funds the establishment and maintenance of
public employment offices. 23 These offices then administer
unemployment benefits. 24 These payments go to states that have an
unemployment compensation program approved by the Secretary of
Labor. 25 The money states receive is determined by several factors,
including state population, the expected number of people who will
need unemployment benefits, the cost of administering those benefits,
and “such other factors” that the Secretary of Labor deems relevant. 26
Additionally, section 503(a)(1) requires state unemployment programs
to be “reasonably calculated to insure full payment of employment
compensation when due.” 27 According to California Department of Human
Resources Development v. Java, one of the few cases about unemployment
insurance ever decided by the Supreme Court, 503(a)(1)’s language
means that payment must be disbursed to applicants as soon as
administratively possible. 28
According to the Department of Labor, state workforce agencies
must submit a Resource Justification Model each year. 29 This report
contains cost data from state unemployment offices for the preceding
fiscal year. 30 The Department of Labor then combines this cost
information and the states’ actual workload from the previous year with
unemployment projections for the upcoming year to determine staffing
levels for the next year. 31 By multiplying these staffing levels by salary
rates, the Department determines the “base allocation” for each state,
which is announced in June or July of each fiscal year. 32 When actual
workloads exceed these projections, states may apply for grants for
“above-base” administrative funding. 33 If approved, based on various
factors including the “equitable treatment” of other states asking for
assistance, the grants are provided quarterly to the Secretary of the
Treasury. 34 But because these “above-base” grants must still fit within
the budget set by the Department of Labor at the beginning of the year,

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

42 U.S.C. § 1104(e).
42 U.S.C. § 1101(c).
42 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 502(a).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1).
See Cal. Dep’t of Hum. Res. Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130 (1971).
DIRECTORS’ GUIDE, supra note 10.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
20 C.F.R. § 601.6 (2020).
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there is no guarantee states will receive any funding beyond their
projected need. 35
B. Unemployment Insurance Fraud in 2020
When unexpected circumstances cause a sharp increase in
unemployment claims, state offices are often left without resources to
process the extra claims. Because administrative funding is often set
before an economic emergency occurs, allocated federal funds do not
allow offices to staff at sufficient levels. Furthermore, extra funding
requests are not always granted. This leaves state offices with an
inadequate number of staff to handle the influx of claims. As a result,
offices experience backups, which can cause them to cut corners to
shorten processing times so claimants can receive benefits faster.
Although eliminating extra steps (such as checking for fraud) may
hasten the process upfront, it can cause extreme slowdowns later if
scammers take advantage of the lessened security, as they did in
Washington.
This Section details how Washington handled increased
unemployment insurance claims in early 2020, during the beginning of
the COVID-19 pandemic. To speed up claims processing, the state
eliminated certain measures intended to catch fraud. 36 Scammers
exploited this practice, which cost the state millions of dollars and
delayed relief to Washington residents. 37 This Note uses Washington
as an example of a wider phenomenon that affected states across the
country during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Seattle, Washington was among the first cities in the United States
to be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Washington Governor Jay
Inslee issued a stay-at-home order for all nonessential workers in
March 2020, just days after closing all bars and restaurants in the
state. 38 As all nonessential businesses shut down, many people lost their
jobs and had to apply for unemployment benefits with the state. Claims
quickly rose from 5,000–7,000 per week to “a peak of 181,975 initial
claims in a single week,” an increase of 2900% over pre-pandemic
levels. 39
The staff in the Washington Employment Security Department
(ESD) offices could not keep up with the increased demand, and
35. DIRECTORS’ GUIDE, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that although states may request extra
funds, “the reimbursement rate per FTE may be less than 100% of the base funding rate.”).
36. Brunner et al. supra note 1.
37. Id.
38. Rachel La Corte, Washington Governor Issues Two-Week Stay-at-Home Order, AP NEWS (Mar. 23,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/5abcb144b6d0f106436e67c7930a5243 [https://perma.cc/VV4D-9ZFK].
39. Brunner et al., supra note 1.
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because there was no funding for extra personnel, the offices were
quickly overwhelmed. 40 The state suspended the waiting period, which
was previously in place to catch fraud, to lower staff workload and
expedite payments to the thousands of Washingtonians in need.41
Although this helped with the overcrowding of the unemployment
system, it also meant the offices could no longer efficiently check new
benefits applications for fraud. 42 A group called Scattered Canary
quickly stepped in to exploit this change in protocol. 43
Scattered Canary is a fraud ring based in Nigeria.44 The group
began modestly, running scams on Craigslist, but has grown over the
past decade and now targets businesses, governments, and individuals
on a mass scale. 45 After Congress passed legislation in response to
COVID-19 in late March 2020—which expanded the number of people
eligible for unemployment benefits, and thus further increased
claims—Scattered Canary was able to hide its fraudulent activity
amidst the nationwide rise in unemployment benefits requests. 46
Washington was one of many states attacked by Scattered Canary, 47 but
the state was hit especially hard because of its unique combination of
overrun offices and slashed fraud-catching protocols.
Washington allows its residents to file unemployment claims
online using information that is easily accessible to fraudsters who use
common identity theft tactics. 48 In this instance, Scattered Canary
submitted claims using data gathered from previous data breaches 49
and payroll data theft from March and April. 50 These fraudulent claims
were filed before the actual unemployed persons had a chance to do so,
or in some cases, for people who had not even lost their jobs. 51 Due to a
temporarily suspended waiting period, which was shelved to help
expedite the backlog of incoming unemployment claims, Washington’s

40. Id.; see supra Section I.A.
41. Brunner et al., supra note 1. Washington and other state systems usually have a
mandatory delay between when a claim is filed and paid in order to give unemployment offices the
opportunity to investigate each claim for fraud.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act in
late March 2020, approving an extra $600 per week per laid-off worker to combat widespread
unemployment resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. H.R. 748, 116th Cong., 134 Stat. 281, 318
(2020).
47. See US Unmasks “Scattered Canary,” a Nigerian Online Scam Gang, PAGEONE (May 20, 2020),
https://pageone.ng/2020/05/20/us-unmasks-scattered-canary-a-nigerian-online-scam-gang/
[https://perma.cc/TP3M-NYKV] [hereinafter PAGEONE].
48. Brunner et al., supra note 1.
49. Id.
50. Hay Newman, supra note 6.
51. Id.
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unemployment benefits offices did not realize that the payments were
sent to mostly out-of-state bank accounts with no connection to the
named beneficiaries.52
ESD offices also missed that many of the email addresses
provided by the fraudsters were seemingly random and duplicative. 53
Scattered Canary exploited a quirk in how Gmail reads its email
addresses to create many unemployment claims under one
managing address; the Google algorithm does not recognize periods
as characters, so addresses like scatteredcanary@gmail.com and
scatter.ed.canar.y@gmail.com both route to the same inbox.54 By
inserting periods at random, Scattered Canary scammers could create
multiple unemployment accounts from one email inbox. 55 In one
extreme example, 259 separate accounts were set up using variations of
the same email address. 56 The offices likely would have been able to
catch the repeating email addresses under normal circumstances, but
the extreme surge in cases forced the state to cut corners—namely
fraud-detection measures—to process its claims.57
By May 19, 2020, at least 174 fraudulent claims had been submitted
and paid in Washington alone. 58 By the time the state managed to take
any action, millions of dollars had been stolen. 59 Eventually,
Washington had to pause all unemployment payments in order to
dedicate its unemployment office staff to differentiating between real
and fraudulent claims. 60 This pause hurt Washingtonians, as it
prevented many from collecting their only source of income.61

52. See Massive Fraud Against State Unemployment Insurance Programs, supra note 6.
53. Brunner et al., supra note 1.
54. PAGEONE, supra note 47.
55. Id.
56. Emma Woollacott, African Cybercriminals Net Millions in Fraudulent COVID-19 Government
Claims, FORBES (May 20, 2020, 6:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2020/05/20
/african-cybercriminals-net-millions-in-fraudulent-covid-19-government-claims/#475a8ab2944f
[https://perma.cc/3BUQ-X4G5].
57. See Brunner et al., supra note 1.
58. Hay Newman, supra note 6.
59. Id.
60. Jim Brunner & Paul Roberts, Washington Halts Unemployment Payments for 2 Days After
Finding $1.6 Million in Fraudulent Claims amid Coronavirus Pandemic, SEATTLE TIMES (May 14, 2020, 2:03
PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/washington-halts-unemploymentpayments-for-two-days-after-finding-1-6-million-in-fraudulent-claims-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/P3FL-CHHM].
61. See Victor Ordonez & Layne Winn, States Are Running out of Unemployment Money, but Claimants
Shouldn’t Worry, ABC NEWS (May 7, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/states-runningunemployment-money-claimants-shouldnt-worry/story?id=70495863 [https://perma.cc/7T6P-KNKQ].
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C. Other Sources of Funding Cannot Help Here
States like Washington needed emergency administrative funding
to increase staffing to keep up with the demands of the COVID-19
pandemic, and states will need these funds during inevitable future
economic crises. During the coronavirus pandemic, state offices were
forced to cut corners because of insufficient funding, which fueled the
fraud crisis. Money allocated through ESAA based on previous averages
and projected future need was insufficient because ESAA could not dole
out extra funds quickly enough to meet individuals’ needs.
Unfortunately, other existing funding sources cannot effectively
respond to crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic either. Namely, states
cannot access EUCA funds in a timely manner because they must wait
for appropriation from Congress, and FUA loans can only cover
unemployment benefits, not administrative costs.
EUCA provides funds for extended unemployment (a federal
program) and serves as a funding source for congressionally sanctioned
emergency payments, such as those that were included in the 2020
CARES Act. 62 Withdrawals from EUCA may also be used to cover
administrative costs, but only pursuant to an act of Congress. 63 This
means that states may use this money to increase staffing levels during
crises, but only if Congress passes an act allowing them to do so. In the
case of the COVID-19 pandemic, when thousands of state residents
were filing new claims each week, 64 even short delays created
overwhelming backlogs in the unemployment insurance system. 65
States needed to be able to hire new staff immediately to process the
increasing number of new claims.
The other available federal fund, FUA, grants loans to states whose
own reserves have been exhausted during times of heightened
unemployment. 66 But this money must be used exclusively to pay
unemployment benefits; it cannot be used to cover administrative
costs, such as hiring new staff. 67 In fact, states jeopardize their resident
employers’ federal tax credit eligibility if they use the funds to pay
administrative costs. 68 Additionally, states could lose federal approval

62.
63.
64.

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1105.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2).
See KATELIN P. ISAACS & JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11475, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE PROVISIONS IN THE CARES ACT (Apr. 9, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/IF/IF11475 [https://perma.cc/5GDT-EWC6].
65. See e.g., Brunner et al., supra note 1.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(3)(C).
68. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP 3
(2019), https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/partnership.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWA5-QPS6].
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of their own state unemployment taxes. 69 This means that FUA funds
are off-limits, regardless of administrative need.
States can request loans from FUA during periods of prolonged
unemployment, 70 but the structure of the federal unemployment tax
prevents states from using FUA funds for their administrative needs.
The account is funded almost entirely through the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). 71 FUTA generates its funds by placing a
6% tax on the first $7,000 earned by each employee. 72 States also may
have their own unemployment taxes. 73 Employers operating in states
with an additional state unemployment tax may have up to 5.4
percentage points removed from the federal tax to accommodate state
taxes. 74 This means that, in states with their own unemployment taxes,
the effective federal tax rate shrinks to 0.6% “or a maximum [tax] of $42
per worker” per year. 75 This tax is imposed directly on employers, not
deducted from employees’ wages. 76
States cannot use FUA funds for administrative spending without
risking these federal tax credits. For an employer to be eligible for the
“normal” tax credits (of up to 5.4 percentage points), the unemployment
insurance law in the employer’s state must satisfy several
requirements. 77 One of these requirements mandates that “[a]ll of the
money withdrawn from the state unemployment trust fund account
must be used solely to pay compensation, exclusive of expenses for
administration . . . .”78 Consequently, states cannot use FUA funds to
supplement their administrative costs in times of crisis without risking
state employers’ eligibility for FUTA tax credits.

69. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (stating that the Secretary of Labor will approve state
unemployment insurance programs that meet certain criteria, including that “all money
withdrawn from the unemployment fund . . . shall be used solely in the payment of unemployment
compensation, exclusive of expenses of administration,” implying that state plans which do not
meet this criterion will not be approved).
70. See generally JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22954, THE UNEMPLOYMENT TRUST FUND
(UTF): STATE INSOLVENCY AND FEDERAL LOANS TO STATES (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product
/pdf/RS/RS22954 [https://perma.cc/2JHJ-9WVG].
71. See id. at 1. FUA primarily receives funding through transfers from EUCA, which receives
twenty percent of all collected FUTA money every month. See id. at 3.
72. 26 U.S.C. § 3301.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 3304.
74. WHITTAKER, supra note 70, at 2.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 68, at 3.
78. Id.
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D. Summary
The SSA created an unemployment insurance program which
requires states to submit their policies for approval in exchange for
administrative funding. 79 States receive administrative funding based
on their previous year’s expenses. 80 During crises like the COVID-19
pandemic, state offices must rely on their base funding unless the
Department of Labor grants excess money or Congress enacts a law
providing emergency funding. 81 In short, state unemployment benefit
offices must manage more work with the same amount of staff during
crises because of inadequate emergency funding.
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM DOES NOT WORK
The federal government’s yearly allocation of administrative
funding leaves states with too few resources when unemployment
claims suddenly spike, leading to delays in unemployment insurance
payments. During the COVID-19 pandemic, scammers fraudulently
claimed millions of dollars in unemployment benefits by taking
advantage of overwhelmed unemployment offices that were forced to
cut corners to keep up with claims. 82 This created more delays as offices
had to re-check their work. In turn, many residents lost their only
source of income, and some even faced the possibility of paying back
previously received benefits.
To fix this problem, the federal government should create a new
fund within FUA to give states emergency administrative funding
during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic. Currently available
solutions will not work because of loopholes in the SSA and potential
economic ramifications, such as causing additional layoffs. This Part
explains why the current federal payment structure is ill-equipped to
handle situations like sudden economic crises, the effects this structure
can have on state residents, and why other solutions cannot fix this
problem.
A. The Problem
When the COVID-19 pandemic began, ESD offices were staffed to
handle their average weekly workload of 5,000–7,000 new

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 5.
DIRECTORS’ GUIDE, supra note 10, at 14.
See supra Section I.C.
Brunner et al., supra note 1.
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unemployment claims. 83 As claims skyrocketed, peaking at 181,975 in
one week, the offices became overwhelmed. 84 By the end of April, the
state had received around 860,000 new claims, and staff simply could
not keep up. 85
The problem ESD offices faced is not unique to Washington. It is
inherent in the staffing model that states are forced to adopt because of
the way the federal government allocates money. States are
inadequately prepared to respond to crises because unemployment
funding is allocated based on average need and may not increase when
new unemployment claims unexpectedly and rapidly rise, 86 as they do
during economic downturns. The Department of Labor’s response to
processing backlogs created by poor economic conditions has been
criticized since 1996. 87 Legal professor and scholar Jerry Mashaw notes
that “funding tends to be inadequate to process claims in accordance
with timeliness demands and that, because of the structure of the
funding mechanism, funding always lags behind workload rather than
anticipating it.” 88
When Washington first paused payments to investigate the rising
fraud, it had just begun to hire new employees to help process the
incoming claims. 89 This likely means that, for the first two months of
the pandemic, the state was processing more unemployment claims
than it would have during a normal year but with the same number of
staff.
Other states faced staffing shortages and eventual slowdowns in
payments because they lacked sufficient administrative funding. For
example, as unemployment claims skyrocketed in Michigan during the
second quarter of 2020, unemployment offices could not keep up. 90
Clinical Professor Rachael Kohl stated that, “[b]ecause unemployment
exploded overnight . . . state agencies started this crisis extremely
understaffed.” 91 Michigan began the pandemic with approximately 635

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See DIRECTORS’ GUIDE, supra note 10, at 13–14.
87. Jerry L. Mashaw, Unemployment Compensation: Continuity, Change, and the Prospects for
Reform, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 19 (1996) (discussing a study on the timelines of unemployment
claims-handling across the country).
88. Id.
89. Connie Thompson, State Boosts Efforts to Stop Unemployment Claim Impostors Trying to Cash
in, KOMO NEWS (May 14, 2020), https://komonews.com/news/consumer/state-boosts-efforts-tostop-unemployment-claim-impostors-trying-to-cash-in [https://perma.cc/K4RR-XR97].
90. Meredith Bruckner, U-M Law Professor Explains Unemployment Challenges in Michigan
During Pandemic, ALL ABOUT ANN ARBOR (June 8, 2020, 12:29 PM), https://www.clickondetroit.com
/all-about-ann-arbor/2020/06/08/u-m-law-professor-explains-unemployment-challenges-inmichigan-during-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/2E7M-LRVN].
91. Id.
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unemployment agency employees. 92 Normally, these 635 employees
process around 300,000 claims annually. 93 But in 2020, the offices soon
were processing over 300,000 new claims per week, amounting to 1.8
million new claims by June. 94 As the offices struggled to keep up,
unemployed workers faced roadblocks and delays while trying to access
their much-needed benefits. 95 Michigan, like Washington, eventually
interrupted payments to hundreds of thousands of people to
investigate fraud. 96
Supplying administrative funding based on a state’s recent needs
would work perfectly if the United States’ economy were static. If the
stock market, unemployment rates, and the broader economy were
constant, or even on a steady upward or downward trajectory, it would
make sense to predict states’ future needs based on the past. But the
U.S. economy ebbs and flows. There have been fourteen recessions
since the Great Depression, 97 and most had a fairly sudden onset. 98
Unemployment offices have struggled to keep up with demand during
both the Great Recession in 2008 and the 2020 pandemic, 99 yet the
government continues to fund offices in a way that ignores the realities
of the cyclical economy.
Because economic downturns are inevitable, the structure of the
unemployment insurance program should account for economic crises.
The current system overworks employees, which creates backlogs in
claims, delays in payment, and opportunities for fraud. For example,
Washington lost millions of dollars to fraud in 2020. 100 Perhaps more
importantly, delays in payment because of fraud created difficult
economic circumstances for many unemployed people. Between March
and May of 2020, about one million people filed new unemployment
claims in Washington. 101 Half of these people were still waiting for
money in May. 102

92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Matt Durr, 340,000 Michigan Unemployment Accounts Flagged for Potential Fraud, MLIVE (June 5,
2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/2020/06/340000-michigan-unemploymentaccounts-flagged-for-potential-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/J8GY-Q8KK].
97. Tom Huddleston, How Many Recessions You’ve Actually Lived Through and What Happened in
Every One, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2020, 1:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/09/what-happened-inevery-us-recession-since-the-great-depression.html [https://perma.cc/Z5V3-93G8].
98. See id. (detailing the bursting “bubbles” or similar circumstances which have led to most
recent recessions).
99. Ordonez & Winn, supra note 61.
100. Brunner et al., supra note 1.
101. Linzi Sheldon, State Pauses Unemployment Payments to Deal with Fraudsters, KIRO 7
NEWS (May 14, 2020, 11:55 AM), https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/washingtons-unemploymentsystem-sees-spike-impostors/6472HVRTLRGLDOXKNT45AB5YDE/#:~:text=The%20Washington%
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Because of the nature of the economy and the structure of the
unemployment benefits program, backups in processing happen
exactly when people need money most. As Professor Mashaw notes,
“when pressures build up on the system because of poor economic
conditions, timeliness in performance slips at precisely the time that
delay is most costly.” 103 The SSA does nothing to protect those who are
simply left waiting for payment. 104 As a result, most claimants can do
nothing but wait and hope for the best when unemployment offices are
backed up.
For Washington unemployment offices, inadequate resources
during the COVID-19 pandemic created a backlog of claims, which led
to delays in payment as the offices dealt with a surge in applications
and a fraud crisis. Because more than seventy-five percent of
Americans live paycheck-to-paycheck, 105 these delays had a terrible
effect on many workers’ ability to pay their bills. Seattle residents Silvia
Muhammad and her husband were unemployed in the early days of the
pandemic but were lucky enough to receive timely payments. 106 Then,
Silvia’s husband received notice from ESD that he might have to pay
back all of his benefits because the state, in its hurry to catch fraud,
erroneously determined that his application was fraudulent. 107 This
false determination not only jeopardized Silvia’s husband’s previously
paid benefits, but also halted subsequent payments. 108 The couple
struggled to pay rent and other bills without unemployment benefits. 109
Daniella Nichols waited three weeks to receive unemployment benefits
when Washington paused its unemployment payments. 110 A mother of
four, Daniella was forced to “sell things from my home, including my
son’s car,” just so she could pay her bills while she waited for support
from the state. 111 In both cases, Washington residents were adversely
affected because the state’s lack of resources allowed fraudulent claims
to slip through the cracks, creating delays in payments as ESD offices
worked to catch all of the fraud.

20Employment%20Security%20Department%20will%20pause%20unemployment,to%20stop%
20fraudsters%20who%20are%20abusing%20the%20system [https://perma.cc/4SVW-P3MY].
102. Id.
103. Mashaw, supra note 87.
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 503(a).
105. Jessica Dickler, Most Americans Live Paycheck to Paycheck, CNBC (Aug. 24, 2017, 8:17 AM) https:/
/www.cnbc.com/2017/08/24/most-americans-live-paycheck-to-paycheck.html#:~:text=Seventy-eight%
20percent%20of%20full-time%20workers%20said%20they%20live,from%2068%20percent%20a%
20year%20ago,%20CareerBuilder%20said [https://perma.cc/UVH6-LU8C].
106. Brunner et al., supra note 1.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Sheldon, supra note 101.
111. Id.
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B. The Existing System Does Not Work
An obvious solution to problems associated with underfunding
unemployment benefits offices would be to simply allocate more
federal funding to these offices so they can maintain higher levels of
staffing, even during non-emergency times. But this would be
inefficient. Moreover, this solution ignores the fact that the current
system does work, but only when the economy is relatively stable.
Immediate access to extra funds and staffing is required only when
unemployment levels increase suddenly and substantially. Although
these sudden increases happen often enough to warrant some sort of
support mechanism, increasing staffing levels altogether would be
excessive.
The best way to protect unemployed workers during times of
widespread economic distress is to create a separate pot of money,
namely a federal emergency fund within FUA, from which
administrative grants to the states can be issued. States can get extra
funding in the current system, but they cannot receive money quickly
enough to prevent widespread harm during sudden emergencies. The
rest of this Part introduces, analyzes, and rejects arguments that
suggest impractical solutions or attempt to weaken the case for a new
emergency fund.
1. Federal Law in Crisis
Section 303(a)(1) of the SSA mandates that states must pay benefits
“when due” to unemployed workers. 112 On its face, this statute seems
like it could provide a simple answer to the problem at hand: since
states are federally required to pay unemployment insurance promptly,
we need only demand that states follow the law.
This solution would not help states like Washington in 2020 for two
reasons. First, as recognized in Java, the SSA’s core purpose was for
“workers [to] be paid their benefits at the earliest point that was
administratively feasible.” 113 But it simply was not administratively
feasible to distribute unemployment benefits in a timelier manner in
spring 2020.
Second, payments are only required when due, or when allowed,
under state law, according to the Java Court. 114 To comply with the
statute, states must have methods of administration that reasonably
112. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1).
113. Cal. Dep’t of Hum. Res. Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130 (1971).
114. Gerard Hildebrand, Federal Law Requirements for the Federal-State Unemployment Compensation
System: Interpretation and Application, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 538 (1996).
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ensure the payment of unemployment benefits to those eligible under
state law. 115 Those submitting fraudulent claims are not eligible for
payments under law, so postponing payment to investigate potential
fraud does not run afoul of the Java Court’s holding. Because the
presence of so much unemployment insurance fraud throughout
Washington meant that the claims were potentially not due under the
state’s laws, the delays caused by investigations likely did not violate the
federal statute. Even if courts were to hold that states like Washington
violated the SSA by delaying payments, it is likely that any legal
challenge to the delays would take far longer to settle than it would to
receive payment.
One could also argue that the above reasoning only applies when a
state is overwhelmed by the number of fraud investigations it must
undertake, and therefore that it is too narrow to be an overarching
critique of the “when due” provision. However, there is also a glaring
hole in the way the “when due” provision is enforced.
The federal government enforces the SSA’s “when due” provision
counterproductively, by blocking federal funding to states yet
punishing states that cannot pay unemployment benefits in a timely
manner due to inadequate staffing. In other words, the federal
government’s main avenue to encourage unemployment offices to issue
timely payments is to cut off administrative funding to states that do
not do so. 116 Although the threat of lost funding is meant to incentivize
states to create functional and efficient unemployment programs (and
to prevent states from arbitrarily denying benefits to unemployed
workers), it is ineffective when payments are not being made because of
a lack of administrative funding. For example, the threat of reduced
funding would have been useless during the COVID-19 pandemic
because state unemployment offices were already underfunded—and
therefore understaffed—and could not comply with the “when due”
provision. Removing all federal funding would only make this problem
worse, and states would be unable to do much of anything to try to fix
backlogs by themselves.
In summary, the “when due” provision of the SSA is inapt in the
context of sudden economic downturns that create spikes in
unemployment claims. Even when states cannot process payments that
are promptly “due” because of lack of funding, the federal government’s
only means of enforcing the provision—namely, withholding federal
funding—cannot prevent delays the way it may in other contexts.

115. Id.
116. Sharon M. Dietrich & Cynthia L. Rice, Timeliness in the Unemployment Compensation Appeals
Process: The Need for Increased Federal Oversight, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 241 (1996).
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2. Current Systems Are Too Slow
Section 903(c)(2) of the SSA allows states to withdraw emergency
funds from EUCA and use a portion for administrative purposes. 117 This
provision provides states with some recourse when unemployment
claims suddenly spike, and it seems like it could solve the underfunding
problem by changing the way federal administrative funding is
dispersed to states. States would receive money based on quarterly
averages and have the added security of EUCA grants when times get
tough.
Unfortunately, states can only access EUCA funds pursuant to an
act of Congress, such as the CARES Act. Congressional action is slow;
the bills signed by the president in 2020 spent, on average, more than
380 days moving through Congress before they became law. 118 By these
standards, the CARES Act passed relatively quickly, but it still did not
provide immediate relief. Unemployment numbers had been spiking
for weeks by the time that the CARES Act became law in late March.119
Additionally, many states struggled to understand and implement the
CARES Act for a month or more after it had been enacted, further
hindering state responses to the nationwide unemployment spike. 120
Because unemployment insurance is so complicated, it can take up to
six weeks to train new staff. 121 It therefore is imperative to begin hiring
as soon as it becomes apparent that more staff will be needed. The
current system requiring a congressional mandate forces state offices
to wait for funds that would allow hiring to happen.
Alternatively, states can supplement their unemployment
insurance funding with money from FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund, but
acquiring such funding often takes too long to cover emergency
staffing. For example, President Trump authorized FEMA to supply
grants to states “to make supplemental lost wages payments to those
receiving unemployment insurance compensation,” but this occurred
in August 2020, five months after most states first saw spikes in

117. 42 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2).
118. See Advanced Search for Legislation, GOVTRACK (Apr. 14, 2021) https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/browse?congress=116&status=28,29,32,33 [https://perma.cc/D2Q3-HFJL] (listing the
introduction and enactment dates of every law passed by the 116th Congress).
119. ISAACS & WHITTAKER, supra note 64.
120. See MICHIGAN LAW WORKERS’ RIGHTS CLINIC, LESSONS FROM A PANDEMIC: THE NEED FOR
STATUTORY REFORM TO MICHIGAN’S UNEMPLOYMENT SYSTEM 9 (2021) http://sites.fordschool.umich.edu/
poverty2021/files/2021/05/Statutory-Reform-to-Michigans-Unemployment-System-UM-WorkersRights-Clinic.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PBW-RBYP] (awarding lower scores to states that took more
than a month to implement the CARES Act).
121. Bruckner, supra note 90.
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claims. 122 Additionally, only five percent of those funds could go
towards states’ administrative costs.123 The problem with FEMA
funding, much like with EUCA funding, is that states can only receive it
following presidential action. 124 The president can, of course, issue
unilateral decisions quickly. But relying on presidential action creates
uncertainty and can cause delays when the president fails to act swiftly,
which happened during the COVID-19 pandemic. Until the president
approves the use of FEMA funds to fill unemployment funding gaps,
states must do without.
Gerard Hildebrand notes that “purely federal system[s],” such as the
EUCA and FEMA funding processes, “necessitate decisions at the
outset,” 125 or generic decision-making that does not address statespecific needs. Hildebrand states that “[a]s a result, mistakes in a
federal plan would have wider repercussions than mistakes under a
federal-state plan,” 126 because the latter allows narrower tailoring. In
the context of unemployment insurance, every decision that is left to
Congress or the president affects unemployed workers throughout the
country. Congress’s slow bicameralism and President Trump’s
unwillingness to act until five months into the pandemic 127 forced
millions of people to wait for the unemployment benefits they so
desperately needed.
In contrast, a new fund that gives states access to additional
funding without a federal act could bridge emergency funding gaps
almost immediately. During the 2020 pandemic, states like
Washington could have used resources from such a fund to increase
their staff just days after the spikes in unemployment claims became
apparent. New staff could have processed claims weeks earlier, and
unemployed workers could have had money in their pockets much
sooner than was possible under the existing regime.
Of course, it takes about six weeks to train new staff, 128 so there
would still be a waiting period before unemployment offices could be
fully staffed. But a new pot of funding available by request during
122. Lost Wages Supplemental Payment Assistance Guidelines, FEMA (Mar. 5, 2021) https://
www.fema.gov/disasters/coronavirus/governments/supplemental-payments-lost-wages-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/D9BZ-VDBV].
123. 42. U.S.C. § 5174(f)(1)(B).
124. Id.
125. Hildebrand, supra note 114, at 529–30.
126. Id. at 530.
127. See Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance
Program for Major Disaster Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019 to the Sec’y of Lab., the Sec’y
of Homeland Sec. & the Adm’r of the Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency (Aug. 8, 2020) https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-authorizing-needs-assistanceprogram-major-disaster-declarations-related-coronavirus-disease-2019/ [https://perma.cc/693N-G6XG]
(showing the Presidential memorandum dated as August 8, 2020, five months into the pandemic).
128. Bruckner, supra note 90.
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emergencies would allow state offices to start training staff as soon as
unemployment claims begin to skyrocket instead of after congressional
or presidential action, which would help workers get the relief they
need when they need it.
3. Borrowing Can Cause Problems
An alternative reform would allow states to borrow extra funds
from FUA to help cover administrative costs during emergencies. This
would mirror the program that allows states to borrow money when
they have too few funds to pay their unemployment claims. It would be
easy to implement, as the infrastructure already exists, and the federal
government would not lose any money in the long term. But this
reform would be unfair to the states, which are entitled to federal
administrative funding, not federal loans, and it could lead to layoffs
and hurtful state reforms after an economic crisis subsides.
Additionally, FUA is effectively limitless because it is backed by the
Federal Treasury, 129 so requiring states to pay back these administrative
funds is unnecessary.
This alternative reform also raises questions about fairness. As
stated in the SSA, the U.S. unemployment insurance program is a
federal-state partnership; the states create funds to pay workers’
unemployment claims, 130 and the federal government covers
administrative costs. 131 Administrative funding levels are determined
by the federal government, and although states can request extra
money, there is no guarantee that they will get it. 132 Suddenly requiring
states to pay back the federal government because the federal
government underestimated their needs seems incredibly unfair.
More importantly, states have to pay back FUA loans to the federal
government with interest. 133 When states are required to pay back FUA
loans, they often “pass a bill that increases taxes and cuts
payments.”134 This means limiting which unemployment benefits are
129. JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22077, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION (UC) AND
UNEMPLOYMENT TRUST FUND (UTF): FUNDING UC BENEFITS 3 (2016), https://greenbookwaysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/RS22077%20-%
20Unemployment%20Compensation%20and%20UTF%20-%20Funding%20UC%20Benefits_
1.pdf#:~:text=Title%20XII%20of%20the%20SSA%20allows%20the%20FUA,Treasury%20and%20the%
20federal%20debt%20would%20be%20decreased. [https://perma.cc/E3DH-Z3BK].
130. See Federal Unemployment Tax, supra note 15.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1101.
132. DIRECTORS’ GUIDE, supra note 10, at 14.
133. DIRECTORS’ GUIDE, supra note 10, at 10. See also Bruckner, supra note 90. Professor Kohl
mentions that to prepare for the next recession, the federal government should offer “noninterest”
and “interest-free” loans to states.
134. Ordonez & Winn, supra note 61.
THE
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available to workers and other cost-cutting measures that hurt states’
unemployed populations.
For example, Michigan owed the federal government almost $4
billion following the Great Recession. 135 Michigan also paid out around
$200 million in “overpayments” during the crisis. 136 The state’s fix was
to introduce the Michigan Integrated Data Automated System
(MiDAS), a computer system designed to automatically catch more
fraud than State employees had during the recession. 137 Michigan’s goal
was to lower its expenses by automating and thereby enhancing its
fraud-catching system, so the State could pay back its debt to the
federal government. 138 Unfortunately, MiDAS ended up erroneously
flagging many requests as fraudulent, and unemployed workers across
the state unfairly lost their payments and were precluded from
receiving more until they paid back claims the system considered
fraudulent. 139 Other workers, like Lindsay Perry and her husband, were
fined astronomical sums of money as punishment for receiving
“fraudulent” payments. 140 For the Perrys, this fine had lasting
consequences, as it forced them into bankruptcy and ruined their
credit. 141 Ironically, MiDAS still was unable to catch fraudulent
Scattered Canary claims in 2020.142
Other states choose to fund their debt payments by demanding
more money from employers, which often forces layoffs, even after the
economic crisis is over.143 To raise money from employers, states often
pass bills that both increase unemployment taxes and cut
unemployment benefits. 144 Workers bear the brunt of these actions
through smaller payments and the threat of another round of layoffs at
the end of the crisis. 145
Forcing states to take out additional FUA loans to increase staffing
would prolong economic crises. States would respond to economic
slowdowns by cutting unemployment benefit payments and increasing

135. Sarah Alvarez & Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Unemployment System Designed to Slow
Payments Working All Too Well, BRIDGE M ICH . (July 20, 2020), https://www.bridgemi.com
/michigan-government/michigan-unemployment-system-designed-slow-payments-workingall-too-well [https://perma.cc/48C9-REXX].
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Alejandro de la Garza, States’ Automated Systems Are Trapping Citizens in Bureaucratic
Nightmares with Their Lives on the Line, TIME (May 28, 2020) https://time.com/5840609/algorithmunemployment/ [https://perma.cc/2VYU-BSHB].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Ordonez & Winn, supra note 61.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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taxes on employers. This would create desperate conditions for
unemployed workers who no longer qualify for payments and cause
employers to lay off employees, thereby increasing the pool of
unemployed workers. Because the federal government is responsible
for paying administrative costs, it should continue to do so when states
need emergency administrative funding.
Finally, one could argue that states must pay back emergency
administrative money because FUA could run out of money before the
end of any given crisis, but that is unlikely to happen. FUA had $78
billion available at the beginning of the pandemic.146 By July, states had
requested $38 billion. 147 But this is not as big a problem as it seems. If
FUA runs out of money, Title XII of the SSA allows the fund to borrow
directly from the U.S. Treasury. 148 Although issuing new securities for
these loans would increase the United States’ deficit, additional
unemployment benefits would have the same effect. What would be the
point of funding additional unemployment benefit claims if there is not
enough staff to process them?
C. Summary
The federal-state system for funding unemployment benefits is
complicated. Although states can obtain additional administrative
funding during emergencies within the current system, this system
does not allow states to access such funds without congressional or
presidential action. For this reason, states during crises are forced to
process more claims with the same number of staff, which delays
unemployment benefit payments and creates widespread financial
hardship.
III. MONEY SHOULD BE REALLOCATED TO A NEW EMERGENCY FUND TO
PREPARE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT CRISES
As Section II.C of this Note explains, FUA began the COVID-19
crisis with $78 billion in available funds. 149 Some states requested loans
from FUA when they ran out of their base funding for unemployment
benefits. 150 These loans could be requested as needed and did not
require congressional or presidential action.151
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
WHITTAKER, supra note 129, at 3.
Ordonez & Winn, supra note 61.
Id.
See id.
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Although these loans gave states the money they needed to
distribute unemployment insurance benefits to residents in need, they
did little to alleviate rising administrative costs. This is because the
federal government restricts how states can spend FUA loans. 152 As a
result, unemployment offices were seriously overworked, and
payments slowed as staff struggled to keep up with the surge in
claims. 153 Then, scammers took advantage of employee shortages, and
states were forced to pause their operations and delay benefits to
investigate fraud. 154
If emergency administrative funds had been more accessible, state
offices could have increased their staffing levels as soon as it became
apparent that claims were on the rise. This Part explains how and why
emergency administrative funds should be set aside to prevent
administrative backlogs during future crises.
A. Method for Reform
To better assist states during economic crises, the Department of
Labor should make FUA money available to states in the form of grants
that supplement states’ administrative funding. These grants should be
available upon request by the states when those states meet certain
criteria, such as a significant, unexpected increase in new
unemployment claims.
By authorizing funds on an as-requested basis, the Department of
Labor would enable states to access this money much more quickly than
they could if forced to wait for congressional action (e.g., the CARES
Act) or presidential action (e.g., FEMA funding). These states could
determine the amount of funding they need for themselves, without
relying on a one-size-fits-all program by the federal government, and
they could get funding more quickly than through any other program.
This funding must be given as grants. Although FUA traditionally
provides emergency loans to states when their own unemployment
benefit coffers run dry, 155 this new money would be different as it would
be solely for administrative expenses. Under the current system, states
are not responsible for paying their own administrative costs; that is
the job of the Department of Labor. 156 Thus, requiring states to take out
loans to pay for additional, unexpected administrative costs would be

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1321(a).
Brunner et al., supra note 1.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1321.
42 U.S.C. § 1101(c).
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unfair and would create more economic turmoil, as Part II of this Note
discusses.
Supplemental administrative funding could theoretically also come
out of EUCA or ESAA. Both would provide certain benefits, but of the
three, FUA is the best equipped to begin distributing these funds. ESAA
provides normal administrative funding to states, yet it is only set up to
do so through the usual allocation process based on yearly averages and
projected need. 157 Adding as-needed distribution would require ESAA to
create new request intake processes. FUA, on the other hand, can
already process as-needed requests, as it currently distributes
unemployment funding loans to the states upon request. 158
EUCA could also provide emergency administrative funding, but it
is poorly set up to do so. EUCA disburses emergency funds to the
states. 159 Although this fund seems primed to provide states with
emergency administrative funds, creating processes to do so would be
inefficient because FUA already has these capabilities.
Creating an emergency administrative fund within EUCA may also
generate redundancies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, states needed
extra administrative support from both FEMA allocations and the
CARES Act. 160 This need for funding highlights the benefits to states of
having access to more than one source of financial assistance:
immediate emergency funding and long-term congressional relief.
Adding emergency administrative funds to FUA, not EUCA, would
create a distinct way for states to meet their administrative needs while
waiting for Congress to act. FUA is already administering loans upon
request by the states. Thus, FUA is best suited to distribute extra
administrative money during economic crises.
B. Emergency Fund Precedent
The existence of a national emergency reserve, whether it be a fund
or a stockpile of goods, is not a new concept in the United States. For
example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Strategic National Stockpile are both reserves that provide goods,
services, or money to states during crises.161 The difference between
157. See DIRECTORS’ GUIDE, supra note 10, at 14.
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 1104.
159. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1105.
160. See Lost Wages Supplemental Payment Assistance Guidelines, FEMA (Mar. 5, 2021), https://
www.fema.gov/disasters/coronavirus/governments/supplemental-payments-lost-wages-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/52XU-V9N6]; see also ISAACS & WHITTAKER, supra note 64.
161. See Strategic National Stockpile, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: PUB. HEALTH
EMERGENCY, https://www.phe.gov/about/sns/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/5PPX-9S4Q]
(Aug. 9, 2021) (“The supplies, medicines, and devices for lifesaving care contained in the stockpile
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these funds and the proposed FUA fund is that FEMA and the Stockpile
provide supplemental resources to states that are unprepared to handle
certain crises, whereas the new FUA fund would help states bridge
funding gaps created by the federal government. Thus, while the
distribution of FEMA and Stockpile resources require presidential or
congressional approval, the disbursement of FUA funds should not.
One reserve that was essential at the beginning of the COVID-19
pandemic was the Strategic National Stockpile. The Public Health
Service Act authorizes the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to create a stockpile of “drugs, vaccines, and other
medical products and supplies” to keep in reserve for major health
emergencies in the United States and its territories. 162 According to
HHS, the Stockpile’s goal is to supplement state and local medical
supplies during emergencies. 163 Stockpile products are only available to
states after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration authorizes them for
emergency use. 164
Another widely recognized source of federal emergency aid is
FEMA. FEMA can distribute wide varieties of aid across the country, but
only after the president has declared an area a “disaster.” 165 This aid can
be anything from emergency workers to grant money. 166 FEMA can be
loosely classified as an emergency reserve because Congress allocates
funds to it 167 in order to help states in trouble. Like the dissemination of
goods from the Strategic National Stockpile, FEMA’s aid can only be
distributed pursuant to a formal act from the president. 168 FEMA aims
“to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the
Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out
their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result
from such disasters.” 169 In other words, like the Strategic National

can be used as a short-term, stopgap buffer when the immediate supply of these materials may not
be available or sufficient.”); See How a Disaster Gets Declared, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/disasters
/how-declared [https://perma.cc/BTG4-QLAQ] (Sept. 3, 2021) (describing the type of aid FEMA is
allowed to provide once a disaster has been declared).
162. Strategic National Stockpile Fact Sheet, ASS’N OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFS., https://
astho.org/Programs/Preparedness/Public-Health-Emergency-Law/Emergency-Use-AuthorizationToolkit/Strategic-National-Stockpile-Fact-Sheet/ [https://perma.cc/7YK6-XZAF].
163. Strategic National Stockpile, supra note 161.
164. Products, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, https://
www.phe.gov/about/sns/Pages/products.aspx [https://perma.cc/LMH4-HL92] (Aug. 9, 2021).
165. FEMA, supra note 160.
166. Id.
167. See JUSTIN MURRAY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33226, EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
LEGISLATION FOR DISASTER ASSITANCE: SUMMARY DATA FY1989 TO FY2006 1 (July 10, 2006), https://
www.everycrsreport.com/files/20060710_RL33226_5b74b98962ac83628052b8d21d2ffde659721f7f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6E9P-KRQ3] (detailing the amount of supplemental funding allocated to FEMA from
1989–2006 for disaster relief measures).
168. FEMA, supra note 161.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (101(b)).
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Stockpile, FEMA is a source of aid to states when states’ individual
reserves are insufficient.
The difference between the existing reserves mentioned above and
this Note’s proposed reform are twofold. First, both existing reserves
are structured differently from the proposed fund in FUA. The Strategic
National Stockpile holds medical goods in reserve instead of funds,170
and FEMA’s “reserve” serves a much wider purpose than FUA’s would.171
Second, and more importantly, the Strategic National Stockpile and
FEMA both serve as stopgaps for when states do not do enough to
prepare to provide for their residents during widespread crises.
Because states are expected to make their own preparations for
emergencies, such as natural disasters and pandemics, FEMA and the
Stockpile are sources of last resort when states lack sufficient supplies.
This contrasts the proposed FUA emergency fund, which would make
up for the federal government’s inadequate preparation. In other words,
the FUA emergency fund would bridge funding gaps when the federal
government’s original allocations to state unemployment benefit
offices are insufficient. While FEMA and the Strategic National
Stockpile make up for states’ own unpreparedness, the proposed fund
within FUA would supplement existing, mandatory federal aid.
Because FEMA and the Stockpile differ in purpose from the
proposed FUA fund, it makes sense that these existing reserves can be
given to states only after authorization from higher authorities.
Without this added precaution, states could strategically plan to be
unprepared for disasters and use the Stockpile and FEMA to provide for
all of their residents’ needs.
In contrast, funds from a FUA reserve must be granted on an asrequested basis. States cannot choose to be more or less prepared to
cover additional unemployment administration costs during sudden
economic downturns because these costs are not supposed to be their
responsibility. The federal government is required to cover these costs,
so it makes little sense to force states to wait for Congress to pass an
emergency act to fix the federal government’s mistake.
The existence of emergency funds and stockpiles shows that it is
possible to create federal reserves to help states during emergencies.
Because FEMA and the Strategic National Stockpile serve different
purposes than the proposed FUA fund, it makes sense that they are only
available to states pursuant to federal authorization. But these
differences also underscore why FUA funds must be available to states
upon request; otherwise, states in need would suffer because of the
federal government’s poor planning.

170.
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See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, supra note 164.
See FEMA, supra note 160 (detailing the scope and structure of FEMA allocations).
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C. What Will This Emergency Fund Do?
A new pot of emergency funding would protect states against
inevitable, yet unpredictable, economic downturns. Without this fund,
the U.S. government would continue allocating administrative funds in
a way that is at odds with the fluctuation of the national economy. To
put it in perspective, administrative funding given to states by ESAA
increased by less than two percent between 2019 and 2020. 172 But many
states’ new unemployment claims more than doubled in 2020 due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. 173 This means that, across the country, state
unemployment offices had to respond to rapidly rising unemployment
claims and award astronomical amounts of benefits using a fraction of
the necessary staff.
If this emergency funding had been available at the beginning of
the COVID-19 pandemic, Washington’s ESD offices could have started
increasing their staff as soon as businesses began to shut down. Then,
by the time the CARES Act expanded unemployment benefits to more
residents, the offices could have been more prepared for the second
wave of claims. With extra staff, offices would have been able to
investigate fraud, like the scams Scattered Canary perpetrated, much
earlier. Offices could have used extra staff to investigate claims more
thoroughly in April and May and catch fraudulent requests before they
became such a widespread problem. Perhaps most importantly, if this
extra funding had been more readily available, states like Washington
would have been in a better position to quickly get benefits to their
residents in need.
CONCLUSION
In times of economic crisis, one of the most important functions of
a government is to distribute money to its citizens. The benefits of this
are twofold: people obtain the money they need to survive and then use
this money to stimulate the failing economy. In Java, one of only a few
Supreme Court cases dealing with unemployment benefits, the Court
invokes a former Secretary of Labor’s explanation of why increasing
distressed individuals’ purchasing power through unemployment
benefits is crucial to economic recovery:
172. ESAA paid $3.51 billion in administrative funding in 2019 and $3.58 billion in 2020. This is an
increase of 1.99%. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM OUTLOOK: PRESIDENT’S
BUDGET 2021, at 14 (2021), https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/prez_budget_21.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G98C-GZCE]; U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM OUTLOOK:
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 2020, at 14 (2020), https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/prez_budget_20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28Q5-HJBL].
173. See e.g., Brunner et al., supra note 1; Bruckner, supra note 90.
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I think that the importance of providing purchasing power for
these people, even though temporary, is of very great
significance in the beginning of a depression. I really believe
that putting purchasing power in the form of unemploymentinsurance benefits in the hands of the people at the moment
when the depression begins and when the first groups begin to
be laid off is bound to have a beneficial effect. Not only will you
stabilize their purchases, but through stabilization of their
purchases you will keep other industries from going
downward, and immediately you spread work by that very
device. 174
Existing mechanisms for facilitating unemployment benefit
payments are ill-equipped to handle quick economic downturns like the
one caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Because administrative funds
are issued based on average need, they do not allow states to expand
their personnel when the economy calls for such expansion. This leaves
state agencies struggling to keep up with the influx of new
unemployment claims. During the COVID-19 pandemic, states were so
overwhelmed by claims that they missed many instances of fraud from
the scammer group Scattered Canary. By the time the fraud was
discovered, the fraudsters had stolen “hundreds of millions of
dollars.” 175
To fix this problem, Congress should create a new emergency fund
within the Unemployment Trust Fund—specifically within the Fund’s
Federal Unemployment Account—to go to states on an as-requested
basis in times of economic hardship. This money would be granted to
states and would allow them to increase their staffing levels so that they
may efficiently distribute unemployment benefits to all who are
eligible. This increase in staffing would also allow unemployment
insurance offices to investigate new applications more thoroughly for
fraud, increasing the chances it would be detected from the outset.
Without this new emergency fund, unemployment offices will
remain unable to handle sudden increases in unemployment claims
due to recessions and other economic downturns. Scattered Canary
and other fraud rings will continue to exploit holes in the
administration of state unemployment benefits. Unemployed residents
will have to wait for their payments, undermining their financial
stability and reducing their quality of life. FUA must allow states to
access emergency administrative grants to ensure social and economic
stability during times of crisis.
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